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Within many of the industries with a long history of operation in 
India, there is often a wide array of organisational characteristics which 
to a cursory examination appear to be randomly determined. Within 
a given industry, there simultaneously exist firms of various sizes, 
technologies and organisations all of which, regardless of those differences, 
continue to operate over a long period and through fast changing 
market conditions. Groups of firms specialise in serving different segments 
of a common market in a way that cannot always be explained by 
locational advantages alone. Moreover, decisions about issues such as 
scales of operations, marketing practices or about questions of whether 
to buy or to make, when to borrow, from whom and how much 
are likely to differ significantly between firms and locations and 
particularly from those indicated by standard economic theory. 
Industry studies usually focus on the prospects and problems of 
the industry as a whole and on the impact on them of the nature 
of organisations operating within it. Their recommendations include 
measures to remove the particular bottlenecks within the industry which 
apparently hinder its progress and to suggest some changes in external 
conditions which can speed up its overall performance. However they 
seldom enquire into the processes which had contributed to the 
development of the existing organisational setup and which continue 
to sustain it through changing market conditions. 
This study of the Indian leather industry addresses the Issues from 
a somewhat different angle. It examines the special characteristics of 
different agents operating within several sections of the industry and 
also the historical, cultural and economic factors that had shaped and 
sustained those characteristics. In other words, it is to analyse the 
internal institutional and situational logic of the existing region-specific 
organisations that are found in the industry and their capacity to 
successfully adjust to the challenges posed by rapid changes in market 
conditions, government policjes and technological possibilities. The 
analysis is based primarily on the findings of our field studies of 
the industry in Calcutta and Madras; these have been supplemented 
by secondary material from earlier studies done by other experts1. 
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II 
Hypotheses and Design of the Study 
The study examines three broad hypotheses. The first one is that 
firm level organisations in a given industry are the outcome not just 
of market conditions and technological choices but also of the 
characteristics of the agents involved in the industry. These characteristics 
are in each case historically determined and in the Indian context 
have their own regional and community based specificities. Through 
time they come to give a distinct shape to the institutions that serve 
the industry. In their turn, those institutions help to sustain and ensure 
the continued presence of the agents concerned. Although at one level 
it is possible to explain the actual organisational setup in terms of 
problems of market imperfections, asymmetric information, opportunism 
and uncertainties, at another level, these explanatory variables can 
themselves be shown to be related to the historically evolved characteristics 
of the agents and the institutions. 
Secondly, the paper aims to show that the weight of these traditions 
creates an inertia in the industry which is hard to break down through 
changes in market conditions alone. The system as it exists is often 
not capable of responding positively to shifting market conditions: skills 
cannot always be internally upgraded. Financing practices prevailing 
in the industry do not accommodate sufficiently for changes in the 
nature and size of the firms' requirements of capital. It is difficult 
to quickly dismantle outmoded marketing practices. The problem is 
made all the more difficult because the agents who have long been 
associated with particular operations develop skills which are very specific 
to the industry in its traditional form. Faced with prospects of those 
skills and operations becoming obsolete, they offer a strong resistance 
which can be politically difficult to ignore. 
Thirdly, fresh private capital which is newly attracted to the industry 
by favourable market conditions does not always initiate radical changes 
in the existing system. Instead, such firms often find it profitable to 
harness to their operations some of the earlier agents in the latters' 
traditional settings. Their much greater access to information and to 
markets is used by the modern firms to construct some new kinds 
of power relations with which to exploit the older firms. 
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Methodology and Design of the Study 
While the Madras and the Calcutta studies were begun with the 
same objectives, conditions in the two locations were somewhat different 
and the field work in both locations was adjusted accordingly. 
There is very little public information about the leather industry 
of Calcutta. Even the municipal records do not have an up-to-date 
list of the hazardous or polluting units which are currently in operation. 
In a recent interview, the West Bengal Minister for Industries mentioned 
that there were 560 working tanneries in the city which are to be 
moved to the proposed leather complex in eastern Calcutta : but he 
did not specify the source of this estimate. Among the operators in 
the industry one gets an estimate of about 360 working tanneries. 
Given this confusion, the study had to be by and large unstructured 
and unsystematic - depending mainly on interviews and discussions 
through personal contacts with several owners of manufacturing units 
and experts in leather. The leads provided by them were followed 
by the field worker who managed to produce the accompanying map 
(map 1) showing the extent and location of related activities within 
the city. He also interviewed middlemen, traders and mahajans/creditors 
connected with this business. This is not to claim that all possible 
links were explored. Nor was it usually possible to get exact figures 
of costs, investments, and returns from any of the owners. 
In Madras, the industry is concentrated in one cluster in the Chromepet 
area. It was still not possible to get a complete listing of the units 
since many are not registered. However, with the information provided 
by the Pallavaram Tanners Association, the researcher was able to 
make case studies of several apparently typical units. She too was 
unable to get detailed and consistent set of financial data for the 
Madras firms. In the write-up that follows our chief concern is to 
bring out the more interesting problems affecting the industry and 
the more distinctive adaptations made by agents therein to deal with 
those without claiming statistical validity for the samples in either location. 
The next section provides a description of the present state of the 
Indian leather industry and of the particular characteristics of its Calcutta 
and Madras sections. In the four sections after that, we discuss some 
of the more interesting aspects of the firm level organisations and 
decisions. These are: 
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1. The scales of operation and decisions regarding vertical and horizontal 
integration of operations. 
2. Choices of products and markets. 
3. Relations between different firms. 
4. The credit arrangements in the industry. 
The conclusion briefly draws out the salient policy Issues vis-a-vis 
the industry. While the study discusses both the Calcutta and the Madras 
situations, it was found that the Calcutta case illustrates the problems 
of a traditional industry in a more vivid way. It is also the section 
of the industry which is in a deep crisis in the fast changing market 
conditions. So the study has concentrated more on the Calcutta institutions 
and firms and used the Madras ones mainly for comparison and for 
highlighting the region-specific dimensions. 
Il l 
The Background of the Industry 
The leather industry appeared to be suitable for this study on several 
grounds. As one of the oldest manufacturing industries of India, it 
has a very complex structure which consists of a wide variety'of 
production units. Under the traditional caste system, there were several 
castes who worked with very simple tools on various operations of 
skinning, flaying and curing leather and making leather footwear, bags, 
saddles etc. They are still to be found in vast numbers even in the 
cities of Calcutta and Madras. Many of them still work as independent 
artisans using traditional techniques of curing leather in bags with vegetable 
material. They also make and repair footwear and other traditional 
products as self-employed artisans. At the other end are the many 
modern units in the industry which have come up over this ceniury. 
They include large-multinationals like Bata who, around 60 yearc ago 
had started a vast, fully integrated unit to cure, tan and finish leather 
for making and selling footwear. In between these two extremes are 
many large, medium and small units run as independent businesses 
with their own marketed products, or job working units working on 
orders from others. One finds units which integrate all operations under 
one roof alongside others which specialise in only one or two operations 
in the long chain till the final product. In both Calcutta and Madras, 
there are wide variations in the sizes of different units, their purchasing 
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and marketing practices and their technologies even for a given operation 
like tanning. In the last lew years, this variety has, if anything, increased 
with more large firms such as the firm of Ponds Inc. coming in 
solely as a marketing firm for the export market. This is specially 
true of Madras. 
The leather industry makes an interesting case also because of the 
rapid changes that have taken place in the parameters affecting it 
At the global level, the turnover of the industry Ls expected to increase 
rapidly and India expects to raise its share in this turnover from the 
current 3.5 per cent to 10 per cent by the year 2000.2 India's prospects 
for achieving this have brightened further with a recent shift in the 
policies of several developed nations; many of these countries so far 
used to import from India and other developing countries raw skins 
and hides or semi-processed leather which they then used to finish 
for making leather goods: they now find that their stringent anti-pollution 
laws and high labour costs have made this industry uneconomic for 
them. They are now seeking locations in the developing countries which 
can do this work more cheaply and export the products back to them. 
Given its abundant supply of the raw materials, its skilled and cheap 
labour supply and its still very lax anti-pollution laws, India seems 
to be well set to reap the benefits of these changing policies of the 
developed nations. 
The Indian industry did in fact grow very fast in the eighties. In 
the 7th plan period, between 1985-86 and 1990-91, its production grew 
from Rs.1670 crores to Rs.4000 crores. Most of this growth was in 
the export sector which grew in rupee terms by 42% per annum. 
The domestic production and sales grew comparatively slowly at about 
16 per cent per annum (Planning Co. 1990-95). 
A point to note about the industry is the change in its composition. 
Increasingly, more and more of the value of the output is being accounted 
for by processing and finishing of products : raw materials and crude 
semi-processed leather are losing their importance. This development 
is very marked on the export front. In 1972-73, finished leather constituted 
only 9.3 per cent and semi-finished leather 82.9 per cent of the exports. 
By 1992-93, exports of semi-finished leather were banned, finished 
leather accounted for not more than 22 per cent of the total export 
value and the rest was on account of exports of leather footwear, 
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footwear components and leather garments, (data supplied by Leather 
txport Council, Madras, January 1994). 
In the domestic market too the demand for leather goods is likely 
to expand last : over the last decade, the expenditure on non-food 
items by Indian consumers in rural and urban areas has shown a 
very fast rise and as the Murthy Committee has pointed out, (Murthy 
992), there is a distinct possibility that unless checked, the domestic 
demand would push up prices and eat into the prospects of exports 
of Indian goods. 
At the government level, there have been continuous efforts to promote 
the industry mainly because of its potential to generate additional 
employment and value added with relatively low input of capital The 
8th Plan Working Group for the leather industry had estimated that 
a t , t h e j : d n o f t h e ' 8 0 s o f the 1.4 million workers in the industry 
only 60 000 were in the factory sector. In that sector too the industry 
had a lower capital intensity than the average for all India factory 
sector industries. y 
Table 1 
FACTORY SECTOR - 1985-86 
Rs.OOOs 
Leather Industry All Industries 
Productive capital per unit 29 
of labour 144 
Value added per unit of 75 
productive capital 28 
Source: H.L. Chandok et.al. India Data Base, 1990, Vol I Tables 
7.3 and 7.3.34, pp.980-981 and 1014-1015. 
While this position may have altered somewhat with modernisation 
ot many units, modern machinery in the leather industry is relatively 
f r o T a b r o a e d a n d ^ ^ ^ l ° b U y S C C O n d h a n d ™ ^ i n e r y 
Over the last two decades, the government had set up as many 
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as four expert committees on the problems of the industry : some 
details about these committees are given in Appendix 1. Following 
on their recommendations for increasing the value added generated 
in the country, the government had earlier banned exports of raw 
hides and skins; it has lately also banned the exports of semi-processed 
leather. In the 1985-86 budget, an additional duty was levied on exports 
of finished leather as compared to those of leather products. This 
gave a fillip to the export of leather goods. The new trade policies 
have reduced duties on imports of capital goods and other inputs required 
by the industry. The country now imports large quantities of raw hides 
and skins from Europe, Australia and Africa. 
This very traditional industry of India is thus being pressured from 
several angles to become a global player. The response of the industry, 
however, has not all been positive. In the years between '90-91 and 
'92-93, the production of leather and leather goods other than footwear 
remained more or less stagnant. (Govt.of India Economic Survey 1993-94, 
Table 1.32, p.39). Exports of finished leather and leather goods on 
the other hand grew by over 35 per cent in the same period (ibid., 
Table 7.3, p.592). Footwear parts were one of the main export items. 
Clearly, the industry was undergoing some restructuring. Within this 
overall picture, there were wide differences between regions. Calcutta 
tanneries which used to export semi-finished leather to the USSR were 
badly hit by the collapse of that market. In spite of the buoyant 
markets elsewhere, a number of them were forced to close down. 
From Madras on the other hand, the Pallavaram Tanners' Association 
has reported that in these last three years, many new medium level 
unit have been set up to serve the export market. This study is to 
examine the possible reasons for these wide differences in the responses 
of different enterprises to the stimuli offered by the market. 
The Industry in Calcutta and Madras 
Next to jute and engineering, leather is perhaps the largest industry 
in the city of Calcutta and has a long history in this region. In 1901 
there were around 15,000 leather workers in Calcutta city alone who 
formed about two per cent of the total workers of the city. Like 
the 1981 estimates which had counted only 30,000 workers in the 
industry, the 1901 figure is also likely to be an underestimate since 
it would not include the temporary and casual workers or the trader/dealers. 
Industry level experts put the current figure at not less than 100 thousand 
workers working directly in it and another similar number working 
in related operations. 
Because it is an old industry, one finds that its units, though highly 
polluting, are located right in the middle of some densely populated areas 
of this city. Those parts of the city have actually grown around the 
tanneries, leather warehouses and workers' slums. Besides these, there 
are several wholesale markets within the city which specialise in sales 
of hides and skins, tanned leather and footwear. (See Map 1). 
The different sections of the industry have traditionally been identified 
with several different communities and over time, the role of each 
has changed relatively little. The Chinese own the bulk of the tannery 
business. They specialise in tanning cattle hides. There is also a long 
tradition in Calcutta of Chinese shoe makers and seller but this business 
is rapidly shrinking. The rest of the tanning business as well as the 
trade, storage and warehousing of leather is in the hands of north 
Indian Muslims. The entire workforce in tasks upto tinning and finishing 
consists of persons of the Chamar community of UP and Bihar They 
also are the self-employed who operate and work in the small household-
based footwear producing units of central Calcutta. Besides these people 
ol several other communities have set up small and medium units 
for making diverse leather products. 
In addition many Hindu Bengalis, Punjabis of Khattri community 
or Muslims from north India are engaged as creditors or creditor-cum-tra-
ders in the industry. 
The concentration of the industry in Calcutta was due to the large 
supply from the city and its hinterland of both bovine hides and goat 
skins. The goat breed called the Kushtia breed of this region is particularly 
renowned for its skin quality. However, though the leather processing 
industry is concentrated within the city, sources of supply of the raw 
materials, i.e. of the hides and skins are widely scattered. Only about 
7 per cent of the total supply comes from the city's slaughter houses 
The rest is drawn from the whole of east India. Goat skins are almost 
a ways obtained from slaughtered animals. But the slaughtering tikes 
place all over a wide area including West Bengal, Bihar and also 
the north-east .Indian states. Bovine slaughter is banned outside West 
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Bengal and takes place only occasionally and clandestinely in distant 
villages. The rest of bovine hides are from dead animals once again 
from over a large hinterland. In Calcutta there are numerous agencies 
involved in one or two of the various stages before the chemical 
tanning process begins; they collect the hides and skins from scattered 
locations, clean them, transport them to Calcutta, and salt, store and 
sell them in local markets. Almost all these operations are still done 
by the castes and communities which were traditionally connected with 
them. The machinery for collecting, procuring and storing these widely 
scattered supplies remains very primitive. Often the skins reach the 
tanneries after a delay of a month or more. In the meanwhile, they 
are badly stored and get damaged. Tanneries can in principle, now 
correct these deficiencies through chemical processing but that is not 
always done by all tanneries. 
Because leather is a large industry with several marketable products, 
it has always served multiple markets. Apart from semi-processed leather 
and finished leather, the more important leather products are footwear 
of several varieties and qualities and industrial gloves, belts harnesses 
etc. Increasingly producers are also making bags, wallets and leather 
garments. Both the tanneries and the leather products industry serve 
domestic as well as foreign markets. In 1993, Calcutta exported about 
Rs.400 crores worth of leather and leather goods. However, since there 
is no agency which has full information about all the tanning and 
manufacturing units in the Calcutta industry, it is not possible to estimate 
what percentage of the output had been exported. 
Calcutta's leather industry is dominated by the multinational firm 
of Bata which has been in production for over 60 years. However, 
for this study we have left it out of consideration in order to concentrate 
on the serious organisational variations and problems faced by other 
types of units. 
The Tamil Nadu leather industry too has a long history going back 
to the early decades of this century. Madras was the chief port for 
exports of raw hides and skins till those exports were banned in 1960. 
Chromepet was earlier a part of Pallavaram. One Mr. Ray Camber 
started the first chrome tinning factory there. Earlier, in 1880s, another 
tanning unit had been started in Pallavaram. But once chrome tanning 
became popular, all the tinneries around the area came to be concentrated 
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in one area which then became known as Chromepet. At the end 
of the 80s, Tamil Nadu housed over half of the registered units and 
employment for India as a whole. Comparable figures for West Bengal 
were around 21 to 23 per cent. In the case of Tamil Nadu the estimate 
of total employment of about 33,400 persons at the end of the 1980s 
was presumably an underestimate since it left out the large informal 
sector in the industry there. Nevertheless, the Tamil Nadu industry 
was considerably better regulated than the West Bengal one: serious 
attempts are being made to get the units registered with several official 
agencies including the local administration, the Anti-pollution Board, 
the Electricity Department and also the Inspector of Factories. 
Unlike in West Bengal where almost all registered units are in the 
city of Calcutta, leather processing units in Tamil Nadu are spread 
over several districts of the state and each district is known to specialise 
in one or two of the long chain of operations. In each location, the 
units are located in a separate cluster; unlike in West Bengal they 
are not spread all over the region. The Chromepet cluster in Madras 
is situated about 15 km. outside the municipal limits but well within 
the area of the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority (MMDA). 
Though the Chromepet units were traditionally engaged in chrome tanning, 
recent rules of the Authority prohibit units inside the cluster from 
undertaking any of the polluting operations upto the stage of semi-finished 
leather. Nonetheless, about 40 per cent of the units in Chromepet 
are known to be traditional i.e. units which were set up before the 
MMDA regulations were first enforced. They are either still unregistered 
or registered for processes other than tanning though at least half 
do tanning work illicitly. A few still practise pit tanning: but most 
units in the cluster, many of which were set up very recently, use 
modern techniques and are known for the high quality of their work. 
The Chromepet units all work for the export market either through 
direct sales to foreign customers or through sales to exporters; some 
also deal in the domestic market Export deals are on the basis of 
orders from buyers specifying quantity, quality standards, designs etc. 
It is becoming a common practice for foreign manufacturers of leather 
goods to locate their own production units within the Chromepet area 
instead of buying finished leather for production in their own countries. 
Domestic sales of final products are usually through independent retailers. 
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Many large firms with retail outlets sell their own products along 
with products of smaller job working units. 
Ownershipwise, it is difficult to categorise the uruts as large, medium 
or small since many of the ostensibly small units belong to fairly 
large operators owning several similar units. The motivation for this 
kind of decentralisation is partly to avail of the special concessions 
given by the government to the small sector (e.g. reservation of some 
processes upto wet blue stage). Partly too this is because with expanding 
markets, the owners have been putting up additional capacity. Since 
there is often a shortage of raw hides and skins or of semi-finished 
leather in the region, many units import leather in the wet blue 
(semi-finished) stage from West Bengal or from abroad. Other inputs 
like chemicals are readily available in Madras. 
A distinctive feature of the Chromepet area is the widespread practice 
of job work. Any firm with orders in excess of its capacity for some 
work can ask another unit to do it on its behalf on payment of a 
job specific rate. This arrangement is not continuous: it is only when 
a unit has spare capacity that it does work on behalf of others. Several 
units never take orders for a complete product but specialise in doing 
job work of a particular kind on behalf of other units. The job working 
units do not continuously depend on any one unit for getting work. 
Usually these have been set up by technicians with a lot of experience 
and contacts built through years of work in other units. 
In the Chromepet area, both the Central Leather Institute and the 
Pallavaram Tanners' Association have close links with each individual 
unit. There is no parallel for this in the available arrangements in 
Calcutta. 
. IV 
Organising Production : Scale, Technology and Integration 
The leather industry falls into two broad sections which are- not 
necessarily always separated. The tanning units are the more traditional 
and in Calcutta, they form the larger section of the industry. In Madras, 
most units work on finishing of leather but they are increasingly engaged 
in making leather products. We consider the organisation of units in 
the tanning and finishing industry in this section. 
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Almost all tanneries in Calcutta and Madras can be regarded as 
small or at most medium. The only large tannery in Calcutta was 
the National Tannery which is at present lying closed. In Chromepet 
too none of the units are large in the sense of being anything but 
price takers for both their inputs and outputs. 
The Calcutta Tanneries 
However within these small scale units, there are very wide differences 
between the Calcutta and the Madras scenes. In Calcutta, the tanneries 
fall into two broad groups. The majority undertakes processing of raw 
leather upto the stage of semi-tanned or wet blue leather. Almost 
all practise chemical drum tanning but for other operations of flaying, 
drying, stretching, slicing etc. they use primitive manual methods that 
continue to give uneven and indifferent results. This semi-processed 
leather is sold in the Calcutta markets either for a variety of uses 
by local processing units or to be sent off to Madras for further 
processing there. 
There is a much smaller group of tanneries - not more than 10 
per cent of the total—who undertake all stages of tanning from purchase 
of raw materials to semi-finishing and then finishing of the leather 
in an integrated plant; often, along with tinning operations, they also 
undertake making of leather goods. We found these few units busy 
updating their technologies for many of the operations for which they 
had installed new machines. Specially, the units working with hides 
had switched to imported machines some of which were computerised. 
These handful of units had only recently expanded their earlier tanning 
businesses into the later stages. There were however no instances of 
units making leather products expanding backwards into the tanning 
business. This is no doubt because tanning is considered unclean but 
work on leather products is not. 
These modernising tanneries were engaged mainly in tanning of hides. 
One of the units we examined dealt in both goat skins and cattle 
hides: but it had installed modern automated machines only for operations 
on hides. For goat skin processing, the earlier manual machines were 
still in operation. Nonetheless these factories had been completely 
renovated to remove air and water pollution and they had discontinued 
the practice of sun drying of leather. 
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There was no great difference in the two groups of tanneries 
vis-a-vis their access to investible funds. The modernised units too 
had used only family funds or savings from the business for financing 
the changes. In any case at the present juncture, there were many 
foreign investors looking for opportunities to collaborate with local 
tanneries for modernising; but very few Calcutta tanneries appeared 
to be interested in those deals. 
The Madras Tanneries 
In Madras, on the other hand, while a few unlicensed units still 
did pit tanning, the overwhelming majority - over 85 per cent 
- were modern units which had rapidly updated their technologies. 
Here too, tannery units specialised in either hides or in goat skins. 
But both the groups of tanneries had been modernised. Madras 
specialises more in goat skin based products and for this, modern 
machines designed and produced in India are widely in use. Only 
units dealing in hides had imported their machinery. 
In contrast with Calcutta, though the modern units of Madras 
specialise in one or two of the operations and get raw or semi-processed 
leather from outside Madras, there is no regular market for leather 
located in Madras. Nor are the leather processors there interested 
in building special or exclusive linkages with job working tanneries 
elsewhere to get inputs of stipulated quality. Instead they usually 
buy their requirements of semi-finished or finished leather from 
wholesalers under the latters' guarantee of quality. Not more than 
20 per cent of the Madras units had any regular links with units 
located in other districts which produce their intermediate inputs. 
Another 10 per cent had some loose links with some tanneries 
through family connections. 
That in Calcutta, the trend towards modernisation has been much 
slower can be attributed mainly to differences in the markets served. 
All the Madras units are geared to serve the fiercely quality conscious 
west European and north American markets: but the Calcutta tanneries 
had long specialised in exporting semi-finished leather to the USSR 
and other East European countries. In the command economies of 
those countries, the buyers had generally been indifferent to the 
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quality supplied by the Indian tanneries. And since for a long 
time that market seemed secure, there had been no incentive for 
the exporting tanneries in Calcutta to accumulate and invest in 
modernising their plants. The sudden collapse of the market left 
the 'majority of those tanneries totally unprepared for competing 
in other markets. As a result many tanneries have gone out of 
business. The remaining tanneries continue to find a somewhat less 
profitable but stable market for their products locally by catering 
to the domestic market. 
The few tannery owners in Calcutta who had modernised their 
plants were the ones who had much earlier started supplying leather 
processed from hides to other international markets. One firm had 
begun to do so since 1972. Another claimed that the firm had 
done so since the previous generation. The incentive for moving 
to these other markets was their much greater profitability. Although 
exact figures were not available, the difference could have been 
of the order of 150 to 200 per cent. So why had only a few 
of the Calcutta firms availed of those opportunities? 
Also, even if the earlier units might have failed to show sufficient 
enterprise to switch to new markets by modernising, it is still surprising 
that few new modern units have come up to process the semi-finished 
leather that is readily available in Calcutta. 
Expertise as a Specific Asset 
The major problem for Calcutta based units in seeking new markets 
is to ensure the required quality of the raw materials. As mentioned 
before, supplies of raw skins and hides to the Calcutta industry 
are totally non-standardised and chances of variations in the quality 
even within one lot are extremely high. A very large part of 
the supply of raw skins and hides comes from fallen animals and 
from faraway sources. And because of the primitive techniques of 
collection and preservation of the raw materials and the opportunistic 
attitudes of the traders and warehouse owners who supply the bulk 
of the inputs in the markets, the input quality remains highly variable. 
Here only those entrepreneurs who have the expert knowledge 
both to correctly judge the quality of inputs at the stage of purchasing 
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and also to correct the deficiencies in those through appropriate chemical 
treatment at the processing stage can guarantee the required standardisation 
and quality control that Ls demanded by foreign buyers of finished 
leather and leather products. This expertise moreover is available among 
the tannery owners mainly through a long apprenticeship in families 
which have traditions of dealing in leather. 
One can therefore argue that it Ls the availability of this specific 
human asset that separates the modernised tanneries from others. It 
is this asset that had created the potential among the few firms for 
moving to more profitable markets. This has in turn generated an 
incentive to accumulate and invest in technological upgrading of the 
plant in order to facilitate that switch. 
To Make or to Buy 
The main difference between Calcutta and Madras then lies in the 
fact that while in Calcutta only the units which have such in-house 
expertise can hope to compete in the high quality markets, in Madras 
any unit can do so because it can get inputs of guaranteed stipulated 
quality from established wholesalers. So, in Madras the expertise of 
judging the quality of supplies is a readily marketed service while 
in West Bengal it is very much a specific asset of some units. The 
cost of transporting materials betweer stages should be less of a 
consideration for the Calcutta firms in their decisions of whether to 
make or to buy as compared to their Madras counterparts because 
in Calcutta, firms in different operations are all located within a small 
area. It is only because the specificity of the asset viz. the expertise 
to judge leather quality is high that Calcutta firms have to resort 
to vertical integration (Williamson 1985, pp.86-91). 
Since the Madras buyers all focus on the quality conscious export 
market, they are willing to pay a premium for ensuring quality. Therefore, 
there is a wide demand for the services of a wholesaler who can 
ensure the supply of the required inputs by bringing them in from 
many locations (including Calcutta), sort them by gradations of quality 
and deliver the required amounts according to the exact specifications 
to each processing unit at a price including charges for his own expertise 
of judging the leather quality. ' 
The Madras example shows that there are no unambiguous technical 
reasons for inducing vertical integration of units in the leather industry. 
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But in Calcutta, it becomes essential for export oriented units because 
the expertise for judging the quality of leather supplies has to be 
generated internally by each unit. 
Limits of Scale 
This imperative to integrate all operations under one 
management/ownership creates its own problems for the Gilcutta firms. 
Since the operation of purchases requires the specific skills of one 
or two persons(who usually are the owners) and cannot be delegated 
to others, it puts a ceiling on the size of the entire firm. It can 
only expand to the extent that the person in charge can personally 
check the inputs. If that person is the entrepreneur and has also to 
manage all the operations of supervision of production and exploration 
of markets then the ceiling becomes even more binding. 
The Institutional Straitjacket 
Both sectors of the Calcutta tanning industry are thus locked into 
their present suboptimal positions. The majority has opted out of 
modernisation and from entry into the more lucrative parts of the 
market. The small section of modernising units are unable to expand 
their businesses fully in response to the favourable demand conditions. 
The majority nonetheless continues to operate and survive because 
of several historical factors. Their products mainly are sold through 
the Birshul hat market to numerous makers of leather products for 
the domestic market. For goat skins specially, the footwear makers 
provide a ready demand for leather of a wide variety of qualities 
or even of mixed qualities because they produce a correspondingly 
wide variety of final products for sale over a broad price range. In 
general makers of leather products serve a vast multilayered market 
of which a major section is more sensitive to variations in prices 
than in quality (this issue is discussed later). Therefore between sellers 
i.e. tanneries producing leather in lots of varying and uncertain quality 
and buyers similarly seeking to buy cheaply leather of varied qualities, 
the market for leather is regularly cleared over a range of prices 
which the producers consider an adequate compensation for their 
indifferent efforts but not sufficient to induce them to try to upgrade 
their production. 
The system in its turn is sustained by a large army of long established 
groups of agents each of whom deals with a few of the long chain 
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of operations in the process right from acquiring raw skins, primarily 
treating them, bringing them to Calcutta, storing them, selling these 
to the tanneries and taking off supplies of semi-finished or finished 
leather from them to sell to makers of leather products. And as mentioned 
before, these various operations have long been associated With several 
traditional ethnic groups - particularly the Chinese, the north Indfcrtr 
Muslims, and Chamars : these groups have carried on their operations 
for several decades without any recognition or assistance from any 
official agency. In return they have each developed a strong vested 
interest in the control of those particular operations which is difficult 
to break. These traditional agents dealing in the supply related operations 
not only do not always have the necessary expertise; but even if 
they do, the fierce competition amongst themselves forces them to 
cheat, i.e. not to reveal the exact quality of the supplies to the buyer. 
Since these agents continue to control the supply lines from the vast 
hinterland from where hides and skins are collected, it is difficult 
to bring about any changes in the existing organisation. 
The several minority population groups who sustain the system are 
themselves locked into their present occupations due to lack of knowledge 
of or access to possible alternatives. They are indeed working to maximise 
their own economic returns: but their rationality is bounded by their 
past experiences and established connections. This process is particularly 
marked in the business relating to goat skins. For hide tanning, there 
is a growing pressure to improve the quality of the tanned leather 
because the demand for use of the product for domestic consumption 
is relatively weak and the bulk of the produce is used by the large 
number of local units which make industrial gloves, belts, etc for 
foreign markets. That is why the tanneries we inspected had been 
compelled to modernise the technology for processing hides. These 
are also the units which were forced to vertically integrate operations 
because they could not rely on the market to get them the required 
inputs. 
One alternative being used by the modern units is to resort to imports 
of hides and skins from slaughterhouses in other countries; we came 
across units which were importing directly from Africa and Australia. 
This however is a major leak from the foreign exchange earnings 
of the country and a waste of the country's readily available rasources 
of animal population. This also means that the potential of the industry 
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for creating more viable rural employment through this very widespread 
rural industry of the country is being stunted. Reports indicate that 
so far the leather industry in India uses not more than 15-20 per 
cent of the indigenous supplies of hides and skins. And processes 
of removing the animal carcass and skinning, Haying and curing the 
skins are still deeply bound in the traditions of low castes and 'unclean' 
work. 
The West Bengal government's proposal to set up a new leather 
park with modern infrastructure by itself may not be sufficient to 
break through this impasse. Even if this persuades the older tanneries 
to shift to the new site with modernised plants or encourages the 
establishment of entirely new units, the basic problem of ensuring 
for all of them quality control on the inputs would remain unsolved 
unless the existing entrenched institutions can be significantly altered. 
What is needed is a plan to modernise these processes at the village 
level through new agencies created if necessary, with government support. 
The Khadi and Village Industries Corporation has made some half-hearted 
attempts at this: but at least in West Bengal they have been unable 
to challenge the hold of the established agents. The Central Leather 
Research Institute has launched a new scheme in two districts of West 
Bengal for establishing modern plants at rural locations for the preliminary 
treatment on felled or slaughtered animals in the surrounding villages. 
The scheme, however, is too new to gauge its success either in increasing 
the rate of usage of animal skins or in breaking the traditional stereotypes. 
Limited Access to Markets 
It is in principle still possible for the Calcutta firms to hire technically 
qualified experts exclusively to look after the crucial purchasing side. 
This would remove the constraint posed by limits to entrepreneurial 
capacity. However, to make it worthwhile for any firm to hire a full-time 
technologist its scale of operations would have to be expanded several 
fold. Finding markets for a much larger output however, should not 
be a problem because each firm is small in comparison with the 
size of the market 
Nevertheless we found that for several reasons, the firms had no 
such immediate plans for expansion. The most important was their 
problem of getting sufficient investibie resources. All the firms we 
had interviewed in Calcutta talked about the near impossibility of getting 
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loans from the formal sector. The hiatus between public financial 
institutions and firms in the leather industry of Calcutta is indeed 
remarkable and cannot be explained just in terms of risk aversion 
on the part of the former. Even when the potential borrower firms 
have a good record of production and sales over the last 20 or more 
years, they had found it hard to get institutional credit without a lot 
of hastle. This problem is discussed in greater details in a later section 
relating to Borrowers and Lenders. 
Moreover, though the market for leather goods is expanding to 
accommodate increasing supplies, individual firms are wary of banking 
on it Currently, they face barriers in directly reaching the retail outlets 
specially in foreign markets: most have to deal through wholesale agents 
of buyers. This is partly because the producers so far do not have 
the experience, knowhow and confidence to go directly to foreign 
retailers. Their lack of education and sophistication may also be a 
contributing factor. The large buyers in western countries too still have 
reservations about the quality of the Calcutta supplies and prefer to 
deal through agents. This dependence on a chain of personal contacts 
may mean that the demand for the products of particular firms is 
sticky over a considerable period. 
This problem of limited access to markets probably affects the Madras 
units as well. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why most Madras 
units producing consumer products work not as independent enterprises 
but on orders received from importers or from large exporting houses 
with international connections. There are remarkably few instances of 
manufacturing units building large steady markets for the products that 
they have designed and produced on their own steam in anticipation 
of demand. The implications of the existence of this long chain of 
intermediaries are further discussed in the section on Flexibility and 
Power Relations. 
V 
The Choice of Products and The 'Lemons' Effect 
Yet another set of decisions made by firms relate to the kind of 
products they make and the markets they serve. In India the domestic 
market for leather products, particularly for footwear, consists of several 
layers or segments: demand in each segment exhibits somewhat different 
sensitivity to price and quality variations. However, the products sold 
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in the different segments are near substitutes; there are no barriers 
facing customers moving from one to another and often there are 
no apparent differences to mark the products of the different segments. 
The customers know that the quality of the product is variable but 
they have no a priori way of assessing the quality of the particular 
goods they buy. 
Various producers of footwear are correspondingly grouped into several 
sets according to the quality of their products and the extent to which 
they are willing to give the customers a guarantee about that quality. 
In other words, as one goes down the scale of these different groups, 
not only does the quality of the products fall but there is also an 
increasing uncertainty or variability about that product. At one end 
gre the markers of brand named products who provide a guarantee 
pf a given-standard of quality by incurring additional costs for maintenance 
of their standards. Their prices are therefore somewhat higher. At the 
other end are those producers who compete mainly by undercutting 
the prices of other producers but do not provide any assurance about 
the quality of the products. The first group presumably wants to build 
a steady clientele while the others are happy with transient deals with 
an ever changing group of customers. For products other than the 
brand named ones, there is thus an asymmetry in the available information 
about the nature of the goods between the buyer and the seller: the 
seller knows how good or bad is a particular pair: the buyer can 
oiriy go by her own uninformed judgement. The customers then come 
t© expect in each section a certain broad range of quality and also 
of Hhe degree of variability in it and they are willing to pay for 
o*> more tfian the average expected quality in that group. This in 
discourages individual makers/sellers in that group from trying 
/fp.f raise their own standards beyond the average for the segment; and 
actually they are" often tempted to further cheat on those standards. 
This scenario is particularly relevant to Calcutta because of the in-built 
fe\gh degree Of uncertainty and variability regarding the quality of the 
leather available. 
Akerlof who first raised the question of the impact of such uncertainty 
of the quality of supplies on the market (Akerlof 1984) had suggested 
several possible outcomes. One possibility is that there will be a continuous 
erosion of quality of goods in the market with bad items or 'lemons' 
driving out the good items; they in their turn are driven out by still 
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worse ones and so on. This may lead to a collapse of the market 
imposing a cost not only on the cheated buyers but also on all potentially 
honest businesses. This may be partially avoided by the intervention 
of middlemen who charge a fee to build up customer loyalties by 
guaranteeing a stipulated quality of the wares. Alternately, some 
institutions like a brand name come up to provide the customers a 
formal guarantee of the quality of the traded products. The branded 
goods are more expensive than the unbranded ones. 
The Calcutta3 industry however has developed on somewhat unexpected 
'lines. In spite of the tremendous uncertainty about the quality of the 
goods, the bulk of the industry has been thriving. There are no signs 
of an imminent collapse of the market. The Calcutta footwear making 
units can be divided into three broad categories; at one end are some 
flourishing producers of brand named goods. At the other are numerous 
small producers of goods of poor and indeterminate quality. Production 
and sales of these latter kind of goods too has been expanding very 
fast. The losers are the several sellers of long-standing local brands 
who form the remaining group. The industry is thus fast becoming 
bipolar. 
Among this third group of local brand names are several Chinese 
firms of the old China Town in central Calcutta who both manufacture 
and sell leather shoes from their own premises around Lalbazar area. 
These are basically family businesses, which have often specialised 
in making custom built shoes. 
The rest in this group consist of local firms such as Radu and 
Padukalaya which are owned mainly by Bengalis and who have their 
own sales outlets around the College Street market. These entrepreneurs 
have some expertise in judging leather quality and designing footwear: 
but they do not have their own manufacturing units. Instead the raw 
materials and designs are put out to outside workers who are paid 
by the job. This arrangement should in principle make the production 
work completely flexible with no overheads or fixed costs of production 
for the entrepreneur. However, because the brand name owners want 
to maintain an even quality in their products, they usually try to keep 
a core group of reliable and experienced workers continuously in their 
employment. This means that some part of the labour costs become 
fixed costs in the medium run. Also, since the entrepreneurs have 
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no way of training new workers themselves or of ensuring a steady 
supply of additional skilled workers whenever needed, the firms are 
reluctant to venture into uncertain markets. Instead they try to hold 
on to their traditional mainly middle class clientele. In the process, 
they have made no significant gains in the expanding domestic or 
foreign markets. Indeed it is doubtful whether any of them has a 
presence outside the city of Calcutta. Increasingly, they are in danger 
of losing their existing business as tastes change and more competitors 
surge into the market. 
The Slum based Units 
These local brand names are being challenged at both ends of the 
market - by the more modern all India brand names at the expensive 
end and more immediately by the fast burgeoning supplies of cheap 
look-alike products made by the self-employed chappal and sandal 
makers who constitute the second group of footwear makers. They 
too have been a part of the city's industry for a long time; but in 
recent years the business has changed in character and has expanded 
fast At present it is estimated that there are over 2500 such small 
household units employing over 25,000 workers in various connected 
operations: these workers along with their production units are housed 
in some of the dirtiest and crowded slums of central Calcutta. The 
workforce is composed of male workers of the Chamar community 
from Bihar and U.P. who have a strong sense of community because 
of their common language, residence and their devotion to their own 
saint, Sant Ruidas. 
In 1978, Timir Basu in a report in the Economic and Political 
Weekly on these Chamar workers had placed their numbers at around 
10,000. At that time almost all of them worked as home-based workers 
for two or three big traders who used to engage them on behalf 
of four of the major all India brand names in footwear manufacture 
viz. Batas, Kamal, Chrome India and Khadims. The merchants then 
used to provide the workers with some credit as well as most of 
the inputs required including a part of the leather. Of these inputs 
a particular glue that was being imported at that time under a licence 
held by the merchants was crucial for making the chappals and sandals. 
It was through their control of this input that the merchants could 
keep the workers tied in at extremely low piece rates. Basu had described 
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how workers made a living chielly by saving some of the inputs 
from the amounts given by the merchants in order to make one or 
two extra pairs for clandestine private sales. 
In the years since then, the inputs have all come to be manufactured 
in India and are now freely available. This has broken the hold of 
the merchants and led to an entire reorganisation of the industry. The 
workers now work in units of three to eight workers under a master 
worker who can organise his business in any of two or three ways; 
he can buy his own materials from the wholesale market on cash 
or on credit and then design and make the items for direct sale in 
the wholesale market to any buyer. The usual amount consists of 
baskets of 2-3 dozen pairs which he takes daily or once in two days 
to the Yehudi market in College Street or to the Chitpur market near 
Nakhoda Masjid. The slightly larger units often take orders from traders 
supplying uncountry retailers. The latter may provide credit, raw materials 
and designs to the master worker and then take off his output within 
8-10 days. There are also some middlemen who buy the goods usually 
on credit, dispose them off by sales to local small retailers and then 
pay the manufacturer. The master worker can switch between all these 
contracts, depending on his skill and ability to get additional workers 
as required. 
The master worker usually gets the leather from the wholesale leather 
market at Birshul hat. The technology used by these units is extremely 
crude with manual cutting, stitching, pressing etc. In rare cases, the 
unit boasts of the use of a sewing machine. However, the long association 
of the workers with the designs and fashions sold by the large brand 
name owning producers and their continuous exposure to new orders 
and designs from various traders means that the units can produce 
any item and give them the same appearance as the expensive products 
of the big brands. At the same time, since all sales and deals are 
independent and neither the producer nor the trader nor the small 
retailer/hawker is committed to building a steady business, none of 
them feels any necessity to pay particular attention to the quality of 
the products. 
Rather, opportunism is a way of life for all the agents involved 
including not just the footwear manufacturers and traders. The existence 
of this flourishing demand for leather makes it possible also for the 
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leather dealers, the tanneries and their input suppliers to cheat at every 
stage on the quality of their supplies. 
It is worth noting here that although most of the Chamar workers 
have connections with this business in Calcutta which go back to 
several generations, they still regard themselves as outsiders in the 
city. In the tanneries where workers are from this same group, trade 
union leaders note that these workers are interested in higher piece 
rates but not in getting permanent regular jobs. (Samaddar forthcoming). 
They insist on visiting their native villages every year for several 
months in the sowing season. Both the tannery workers and the footwear 
makers put their savings in land and agriculture in their own villages. 
The footwear makers specially keep their families back at home and 
refuse to invest either in upgrading their manufacturing businesses or 
their residences in the city. 
The Bad Driving Out the Good 
The availability of this large supply of look-alike but cheap footwear 
confuses the buyer and makes her deeply suspicious of the quality 
of all goods on sale. In the absence of any definite information, she 
opts for the cheaper supplies. In that deal too she is likely to be 
cheated of adequate satisfaction from the purchases because all the 
agents involved continuously misrepresent the quality of the goods. 
But on the other hand, if she is offered similar looking items by 
an honest dealer at a higher price who tries to assure her of the 
quality of his products, she has no reason to believe him; so she 
either tries to beat down his prices or refuses to buy from him. 
This is precisely how the smaller traditional local brands of Calcutta 
are being squeezed out of the market. In the absence of sufficient 
publicity through brand advertising on their part, most buyers have 
no way of getting symmetrical access to the information about the 
sellers' honesty and quality consciousness. There is also the further 
problem that because those sellers do not have their own manufacturing 
works, they are sometimes landed with inferior goods when their 
subcontractors cheat on quality. So a customer may have had the 
experience of landing with poor items after paying the relatively higher 
prices of these sellers. In that case, even if the seller is now convinced 
of the higher quality of his products, the buyers' assessment of the 
probability that this is so always remains lower than that of the seller. 
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The latter, therefore, cannot persuade the former to pay his prices 
including the extra cost for maintenance of quality. The cheaper goods 
made by the self-employed units then drive out the better quality local 
brand name products in yet another modified version of Greshams' 
Law. 
Another possible outcome of the existence of this uncertainty in 
quality would be to drive the buyers more towards the big brand 
names which guarantee quality. This is in fact a reality; there is now 
an increasing range of new well-advertised all India brand names in 
the footwear market whose organisation of business is discussed in 
the next section. But the new or the older big brand names have 
as yet not posed a serious challenge for the makers of the cheap 
goods. This is because of the high price elasticity of the demand 
of a significant section of the footwear consumers. As is the case 
in Madras, for one group of consumers footwear of synthetic material 
is a close substitute for leather goods and it is only the cheap prices 
of the Calcutta goods that still makes them saleable. 
Similarly, another section of buyers who are mostly young urbanites 
are looking for fashionware rather than durability or comfort. They 
would rather opt for several pairs of cheap good looking but poor 
quality footwear than a costly durable single pair. Here too the bargaining 
point is the low price and good appearance provided by the cheaper 
producers. It is worth noting that because of this shift in tastes Bata, 
who earlier used to sell cheap footwear in non-metropolitan areas through 
their other brand name BSC have withdrawn from that market and 
now concentrate on exports and high quality, high priced section of 
the domestic market. The market in other words is getting sharply 
polarised - between the very cheap goods sold by hawkers from the 
pavements and expensive quality goods made by a range of newer 
brand names. In the next section, we examine this third group of 
sellers. 
VI 
Efficiency, Flexibility and Power Relations 
The third kind of business organisations in the footwear industry 
is perhaps the most typical of the forthcoming responses of Indian 
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industry to the challenges of globalised markets. 
Particularly in the consumer goods industries the recent policies of 
globalisation are likely to bring in increasing competition from near 
substitutes supplied by producers from any of a large number of countries. 
Given these vastly increased choices of goods and services the consumers 
too would tend to become more quality conscious and also volatile 
in their tastes and preferences. 
There are several well established responses of industrial organisations 
to such challenges posed by increasingly competitive and uncertain 
markets. One strategy used mainly by multinational firms particularly 
in the decades of '70s and '80s was to farm out work on various 
operations within an overall production process to locations in different 
countries with a view to exploit the relative cost advantages that were 
available there for that particular operation. Depending on the nature 
of the farmed out operations, the technologies used in them could 
sometimes be fairly primitive and labour intensive, with little use of 
modern machines; they often used low paid female labour in developing 
countries. In other cases the same firms were found using very streamlined 
assembly-line kind of production organisations which were located in 
countries where there was disciplined labour but no labour laws for 
the protection of the workers (Lauridsen 1995). For several reasons 
India was not a part of this international division of labour to any 
significant extent. Nor are Indian producers by and large as yet in 
a position to undertake such multinational ventures. 
Large Japanese firms had developed this system of subcontracting 
of specific operations to smaller units to a very high degree. Here 
the inter-firm relations were apparently highly paternalistic with the 
larger firms providing their subcontractors with R and D inputs, investible 
funds and steady orders. It is usually claimed that the Japanese pattern 
is more of a process of vertical segregation of consecutive operations 
in a production process in the interest of utilizing the potential economies 
of scale at each stage. In operations where such economies existed, 
the subcontracting firm could expand the scale of production, sell the 
extra output to other users and reduce costs all round. However, in 
reality, the Japanese pattern too gives considerable flexibility to the 
operations of the large firm and allows it to pass on some of the 
risks of uncertain markets to the economically weaker smaller firms 
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(Standing 1990, Tauille 1995). 
The other much discussed strategy originated in what has come 
to be called the Third Italy. Here large numbers of artisan type small 
producers are linked with a 'net-work' firm through the practice of 
'flexible specialisation'. The firm of Benettons is one of the most 
famous instances of this kind of network firms of Italy. (Piore and 
Sabel 1984, Beluzzi 1992 ). Here the central firm or agent gets its 
production done through a number of independent producers who design 
and manufacture their own products for sales by Bennetton. The latter 
has built up a world-wide network of direct sales outlets which 
continuously feed back to the former information regarding consumer 
responses to the designs, styles etc. produced by the various manufacturers. 
The firm can then immediately get the original manufacturer(s) to 
supply the items in demand in the required quantities. In this way 
the seller firm can efficiently and quickly respond to changes in any 
section of the market without having to build up its own production 
machinery of any size or quality. The entire production remains flexible 
and responsive to changes in both the size and content of the demand. 
These latter models of course are very much contingent on all the 
involved firms having access to computerised transmission of information 
as well as computer aided facilities for operations like designing, inventory 
controls etc. Indian firms and their agents are still not in the same 
league. Nonetheless, faced with the same challenges they have devised 
what appears to be their own different model of organisation for operating 
in high priced globalised quality conscious markets. This strategy is 
based not on information technology but on some power relations which 
are inherent in the Indian economy. On the one hand are several 
large firms building up strong brand name-based images and their 
own high profile marketing organisations. In the process most of them 
have withdrawn from the actual production work; this is now left 
to a string of small manufacturers who are the other party to this 
arrangement. It is these small firms which make and sell at wholesale 
level the readymade finished manufactures which are retailed or exported 
by the former. While the relations between these two kinds of firms 
are supposed to be strictly through the market with neither being beholden 
to the other, we want to argue that such an arrangement is effective 
even in fiercely competitive and quality conscious markets because 
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relations between the two sets of firms are of a hierarchical nature. 
The larger firms enjoy some advantages over the set of smaller ones 
which make it possible for them to control and mould the operations 
of the smaller ones to their own advantage. 
In economic literature, discussions on power relations in business 
organisations usually focus on those between the capitalist employer 
and the labour he employs (Marglin 1974, Williamson 1985 ch.9). 
The hierarchy and the power used in deals between large firms and 
small firms in India, though less discussed in this context, is still 
very much a part of the industrial organisational strategy. And its 
origin and uses are very specific to the institutional framework under 
which the Indian industry of today is operating. Within the leather 
products industry, this is a common phenomenon extending to all products 
like industrial gloves, safety belts etc. We have considered only the 
footwear industry to illustrate the issue. 
The Organisational Setup 
For this study we covered seven small or medium units in Calcutta 
and seven in Madras. Of these, only one in Calcutta had a direct 
export business. Another sold shoes through its own local shop but 
its steady business was on behalf of Bata. The rest sold their products 
to exporters or local brand name owners. In Madras, of the seven, 
only two firms had their own business of exports to a foreign agent; 
the rest did job work for large firms. It is worthnoting that the direct 
sellers to the export market were firms of longer standing. New firms 
were all geared to producing goods for disposal to the marketing firms. 
The Madras firms did job work which meant that they had orders 
for a definite quantity of a product of given design and quality: for 
this they used their own funds to get the inputs, hired workers and 
carried out the production in their own factories. Although, they had 
standing orders, they bore the risks of their production being rejected 
on completion if they failed to meet the required standards. There 
was also the risk of not finding continuous orders for work. 
The Calcutta footwear-making firms mostly produced goods for the 
domestic market and were in general in a more vulnerable position. 
Most did not have standing orders for the work they did. Usually 
they initiated production with their own fixed and working capital 
and also devised their own designs according to their assessment of 
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the demand. This production was then offered to various large firms 
who bought it for retailing under their brand name provided it met 
their requirements. In several cases, the small units had been supplying 
the same firm for a long time. But this did not imply any continuity 
of the business relations nor any relief from the risks of the designs 
or quality being rejected. The small firms, therefore, had to have their 
in-house expertise for gauging the quality of leather and to design 
the products according to the market trends. 
The large firms included some very well-known brands like Bata 
who have long been in the business. They also included a number 
of multinationals like Ponds and Hindustan Lever who have newly 
entered the export business for footwear as marketing firms. In Calcutta, 
there are many new brand names - Shree Leather, Corona, Leatherware 
etc. who had initially begun as manufacturers of their own goods 
but who now buy off supplies from the small enterprises to sell under 
their brand names in the all India markets. 
The large firms therefore appear to concentrate on building up their 
marketing abilities rather than their production work. In other words, 
the strategic core (Rive 1990, pp. 139-142) around which the firms 
are organised has come to consist mainly of managerial skills for 
getting information about markets, for creating a bright and saleable 
market image and for contacting and winning buyers in ever new 
markets. It does not include skills for production. In the case of export 
oriented firms and a firm like Bata which has always played up its 
designing ability, the strategic core probably also includes skills for 
designing footwear. But in many new firms in Calcutta, even these 
have been left out More important, all these firms have passed on 
the responsibility to find all the necessary expertise to the smaller 
units. Particularly for the Calcutta small units this is a serious consideration 
to which we shall return later. 
Structures of Firms 
The strategic core of a firm Is supposed to be time- and situation 
specific to each firm and its requirements determine the efficient 
boundaries of the firm: i.e. those operations that a firm must undertake 
and those it can farm out are not fixed but can change with the 
situation of the firm. And it is the characteristics of the clients and 
the market that determine what should be the strategic core skills 
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for that firm. (Rcve ibid, pp. 142-146). The firm will keep close control 
of those operations which contribute most to the qualities that their 
particular clients value. Thus for the Indian firms seeking export markets, 
marketing as well as designing skills are of strategic value while for 
those serving the domestic market, marketing and building of presentable 
sales outlets is the core strategy more so than designing which can 
often be left out. It is possible that in time, these brand name oriented 
firms will find it possible to decentratise their sales operations. This 
might happen when their brand names are sufficiently well-known in 
the footwear market (like the K shoes of Britain) to be sold through 
retailer anywhere at a stipulated price. On the other hand, they may 
in time have to internalise the production operations when they can 
no longer rely on the availability of the services of small producers 
as and when required. 
Efficiency 
By standard economic criteria, this two sided organisation would not 
be considered efficient. It leads to extra transportation costs as each 
small firm gets its inputs in small lots and then has to deliver the 
output to the seller firm. Secondly, since the small firms are not sure 
of the timings of orders and sales they have to carry inventories of 
both the inputs and the output. This is particularly true in case of 
the Calcutta firms where uncertainties of input supplies and output 
disposal are even greater. The large firms too, have to keep more 
inventories of finished products in order to ensure their smooth flow 
into the markets. Even with job working arrangements as in Madras 
it is unlikely that they can plan the chain of inventories as efficiently 
as they can in case of their own production. In a small unit, unforeseen 
personal problems of the one or two persons critical for the production 
can cripple the entire production chain. Also, even with dealers to 
supply the inputs, each job working units cannot plan and order ahead 
its requirements because it is not sure of getting continuous orders. 
Moreover in case where designing and planning of production are 
left to numerous small units, the overall quality of the expertise in 
these activities in the industry will be poorer than if these activities 
were undertaken by the big firms themselves. No small firms can 
individually pay for as high a quality of these services as could have 
been done by one large firm pooling that work. 
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Flexibility 
in spite of these inherent inefficiencies, this form of organisation 
has spread fast obviously because of the tremendous premium put 
on flexibility by the marketing firms. They are unsure of their markets 
because they have entered the global scene and also because the 
competition even in the domestic markets is very keen. In case of 
a well established firm like Bata, uncertainty was perhaps not the 
main consideration. Production of chappals and sandals had earlier 
been officially reserved for the small sector. That is how Bata had 
come to put out this work to artisans in Agra area. The system had 
proved itself to be convenient; so it has been continued and also 
extended to new kinds of consumers (export market) and to new units 
in Madras area. 
However, the flexibility provided to large firms by this practice 
is not the same as that in the textile industry of Prado, Italy. There 
the numerous artisan producers produce different varieties according 
to their own initiative for sales through their federated efforts under 
an 'impannatore'. The latter's job Ls of coordinating as their agent 
the efforts of these artisans - advise them on fashions, input purchases 
etc. (Piore and Sabel 1984. p.215). Here neither the various job workers 
of Madras nor the small entrepreneurs of Calcutta have any co-operative 
connections between themselves. Though they often all prepare goods 
which would be identical (part of a large export order) they remain 
rivals of each other for the orders of the big firms and act independently 
in both the input and output markets. In other words, flexibility does 
bring in more variety and local initiatives in the case of the Calcutta 
system but unlike in the Prado industry there is no feedback from 
the market except in retrospect; so the units tend to opt for the status 
quo rather than for innovation. 
Power Relations 
The arrangement is actually meant not so much to encourage local 
initiative and diversified small initiatives as to avoid any long term 
commitment by way of investment in plant, machinery and labour 
on the part of the large firms. Their stake extends merely to the 
creation of some fairly liquid assets like shopping sites. It Ls the small 
units who invest in the fixed plant and machinery and build up skills 
of labour. These small units remain in constant competition with each 
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other for orders of and sales to big firms, so their prices include 
a very small margin of profits or mixed incomes of the self-employed. 
The small firms accept these highly unequal terms because their 
assets are very limited and highly specific to these operations. In Madras, 
in most of the units the technicians/skilled workers and also the owners 
belong to particular (mostly scheduled) castes and communities who 
have long been associated with this work: their skills and identities 
are tied to this industry. They have similar problems as the tanners 
of Calcutta in acquiring confidence and credibility for negotiating with 
outsiders for getting export orders or setting up sales outlets. Although 
banks in principle are much more willing in Madras to lend to these 
job working units, the owners have difficulty fulfilling the norms of 
bankers for getting adequate loans for expanding the business further. 
Competition among the smaller units in the business is increasing : 
older firms do not have the skills and the knowledge to switch to 
other work. New entrants who are usually local skilled workers find 
it easy to enter the business since the machines can be acquired in 
small stages. This means that the order giving large firms are in a 
position to beat down the prices by switching between suppliers. 
In the case of Calcutta the situation is even worse. Madras units 
have the advantage of being in a cluster where learning skills and 
getting information/contacts with order givers are easier. The comparable 
Calcutta units are scattered all over the city: they have often been 
initiated by middle class youths who have no skills in the business. 
Many of these entrepreneurs had come into this business chiefly through 
some family connection with Bata. They had some vague acquaintance 
with the leather business and also with some skilled retired Bata workers 
who had come to work for them. It was the expertise of those workers 
which had given the entrepreneurs a foothold in the industry. In fact 
this faint acquaintance with the leather industry was the only asset 
they had in the high unemployment economy of Calcutta. So they 
had used family savings, built the units on family premises and were 
trying desperately but not very successfully to make the units viable. 
In one unit after four years of operation the four partners who had 
ventured into the business with their own capital were still unable 
to pay themselves even Rs.1000 per month. 
Needless to say, these Calcutta entrepreneurs did not have the skills, 
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the connections or the capital to expand the business, to directly contact 
the export markets or to open their retail sales outlets. Some had 
tried to do so locally but without much success. 
The high asset specificities of all these small producers give the 
brand name owners the power to control the formers' performance. 
They ensure the quality of the work by holding out the threat of 
denial of future orders and perhaps even blacklisting the small producers 
if they fail to meet the date and quality requirements of any of the 
order givers. The Calcutta entrepreneurs specially have to initiate 
production on their own and then sell the goods on any terms that 
they are offered. So far, there has been no recognition of these businesses 
by any official agency: the small units too avoid being in the limelight 
for fear of tax laws, pollution control etc. This means that they remain 
highly exploitable by the big league names. 
In Madras, the cluster arrangements and the existence of bodies 
like the Tanners' Association or the Export Promotion Council has 
generated some support for the small units in the Chromepet cluster. 
However, since increasing exports is the main aim of all official and 
semi-official agencies, the actual producers are unlikely to get support 
against the firms which bring the export orders. As against this, in 
the Italian case small units had acquired strength because official agencies 
had given such 'artisan' units several special concessions of taxation 
etc. Also, their status was accepted by banks and financial institutions 
as a special case. Municipal and local authorities had throughout acted 
as their promoters by providing technical education facilities, specially 
well designed cheap production sites, technical advice etc. All these 
facilities had been combined to give the Italian small businesses both 
the flexibility and the strength to enter new markets and to deal with 
them confidently with prior knowledge of their requirements. (Piore 
and Sabel op. cit. pp.220-229) 
The Madras units on the other hand have been complaining about 
the numerous official constraints and requirements that they are expected 
to adhere to in the name of pollution control, licensing, registration 
etc. If all of these were to be fulfilled it would make their operations 
impossible. So it is they who run the risks of working outside the 
legal requirements in order to ensure that the exporters get their stipulated 
supplies on time. 
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The only redeeming feature in this power game is the fact that 
in recent years, orders have been plentiful. If this continues, the Madras 
units may get to form their own organisations and build their defenses. 
VII 
Lenders and Borrowers 
As in other operations in the leather industry, there Ls a considerable 
variety in the lending and borrowing arrangements used by the various 
agents. Particularly in Calcutta, this issue has brought forth some interesting 
leads which have both theoretical and policy implications. For Madras, 
sufficient information regarding this aspect was not available: but it 
is possible that the issues involved were similar. 
There are three broad types of lenders linked with this industry. 
There are firstly the commercial banks and other formal sector financial 
institutions who are supposed to provide both short and long term 
credit for industrial activties. Secondly, short term credit is provided 
by most traders to their bulk buyers. And lastly there is a large presence 
of informal sector creditors in this as in most other Indian industries. 
The first group which consists of banks and other official lenders 
are supposed to lend at relatively low rates of interest. In some cases 
there are provisions for concessional lending to small units and/or exporting 
units. On the other hand, these agencies stipulate their own measures 
to screen the borrowers : they have to be registered units — i.e. 
units which have an official recognition as functioning units and which 
fulfil the requirements of several official agencies regarding provisions 
such as pollution control. The latter also insist on the borrower providing 
a collateral for the loan and the size of the loan is usually contingent 
on the value of the collateral. The collateral provision is waived in 
the case of the Madras units if the latter are registered with the Tanners' 
Association in Chromepet. There is also a Reserve Bank directive 
in respect of small and tiny manufacturing units to the effect that 
if the projects for which the units are borrowing are themselves worthwhile, 
the banks can waive the requirement for a collateral. However for 
this the banks have to make a thorough appraisal of the project 
In Calcutta, of the fifty or so agents manufacturing or trading in 
leather and leather goods whom we had interviewed, very few had 
ever raised a loan from banks or other official financial institutions. 
Two or three persons who had got such loans did not intend to raise 
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fresh loans after repaying the earlier ones. In Madras, with the guarantee 
of the Pallavaran Tanners' Association many small units which were 
their members had got loans from formal sector financing institutions. 
However, enquiries showed that the number of those who were constrained 
to borrow from informal lenders was much larger. 
In other words, even among registered units, a significant section 
remained alienated from the official credit giving machinery. The units 
contacted complained that the bank procedures were lengthy : specially 
in Calcutta, it appeared that there were many formalities to be completed 
with multiple agencies before banks released funds - and entrepreneurs 
and agents of small units did not have the time or the conticts to 
do so. Specially, the Chinese and the Muslim entrepreneurs felt that 
officers of the lending institutions could not relate to them and treated 
their applications unsympathetically. 
Credit Rationing 
From one angle this may appear as a case of 'pure credit rationing' 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) where among apparently similar borrowers 
some are given credit at the going rate while others are not even 
if they are willing to offer a higher interest rate. This is mainly because 
official financial institutions are not allowed to vary interest rates between 
borrowers except by official directives. More important, it is possible 
that financial institutions are concerned with keeping down their 'costs 
of monitoring' - i.e. costs incurred by them in case of default on 
repayments by the borrowers. Even if the borrower does offer a collateral, 
to realise the outstanding amount by liquidating the asset is not costless 
to the lender; the realisation of the value of the collateral may be 
delayed, difficult or even prove to be inadequate. Since these monitoring 
costs from the point of view of the lenders are likely to vary from 
borrower to borrower over a considerable range, the financial institutions 
would be willing to lend only to those borrowers in whose case the 
expected monitoring costs do not exceed a predetermined level. 
(Williamson 1987). 
It is to be noted that in case of these institutions it is not the 
supply of credit that is the constraint but their agreed level of expected 
monitoring costs: these in turn depend on their expectation of default 
by borrowers. This is where the biases of the lending agents get a 
full play. In Calcutta, there is a general impression among small 
35 
manufacturers that agents of the formal sector lenders do not take 
the trouble to correctly appraise the borrowers' projects or to check 
on the past records of their business practices. They Uike decisions 
on the basis of arbitrary criteria such as the community, education 
or social standing of the borrower. 
Even if these hurdles were overcome, the formal financial institutions 
enforce a ceiling on the amount of loan that they advance to the 
units and this is related to the value of the collateral oftered by the 
borrowers. In case of the Madras units too loans given under the 
guarantee extended by the Tanners' Association are subject to a similar 
upper limit. These limits to the amount of credit are again not because 
loanable funds are scarce but because of the lenders' low assessment 
of the value of the collateral or of the personal riskworthiness of 
the borrower. 
Asymmetry in Valuation 
In Calcutta we found that most of the borrowers had only one 
asset - their residential/cum business premises. For the financial 
institutions, these assets could be assessed only at their market value 
in their present state, use and with their current encumbrances. However, 
since the housing market in the city is highly imperfect the borrower 
is likely to value his residential property much higher in terms of 
its near irreplaceability in his own and his family's perspective. Therefore, 
the value put on the premise by the financial institution and the loans 
extended on that basis are likely to fall far short or the borrowers-
own assessment of those assets. Several of the persons interviewed 
expressed the view that the risk of losing that properly in the business 
for the sake of the amount of loan that they could get against it 
was totally unacceptable for them. 
There is a similar asymmetry between the two parties' valuation 
of the human capital or embodied skills of the entrepreneurs. As discussed 
earlier, in this highly uncertain and unstructured industry, these assets 
are of'crucial importance for building up the businesses. But the formal 
sector institutions rarely take account of those personal qualities except 
perhaps of the kind of high level formal educational qualifications 
which entrepreneurs in the leather industry rarely possess. 
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Assessing the credit worthiness of a business on the basis of its 
existing assets rather than its potential in the market reduces the risks 
of defaults for the lenders : but for the borrower, it puts an arbitrary 
limit on his efforts to develop the business. This can be particularly 
crippling if there are indivisibilities to the project cost. Financial institutions 
are also very rigid about the time schedule for collecting their dues 
which further reduces the flexibility of the business operations. 
Since small businesses cannot resort to the equity market for raising 
investible resources. This limitation on the size of the loans they can 
get slows down their growth prospects. They are forced to wait till 
their own savings from the business or some other source are sufficient 
for undertaking the project. 
We found that in the tanning business, several enterprising units 
in Calcutta had been able to raise funds from foreign collaborators 
for modernising the plant. However, there were many small units engaged 
in manufacturing footwear or other leather products particularly industrial 
gloves, belts etc. who had remained dependent on other larger business 
in the kind of power relations we discussed in the earlier section. 
The Informal Credit Market 
This does not, however, mean that the industry Is starved of all 
capital resources. In fact, there is a very well-established, elaborate 
and multi-layered credit market attached to the industry which practises 
at least two broad forms of lending. The first one of these is trade 
credit: at all levels of the business, starting from dealers in raw hides 
and skins to retailers of footwear and bags on the footpaths of Calcutta, 
the agents taking off the saleable items are allowed a few days' credit 
from the sellers. Among regular dealers, these deals are not charged 
any interest. But in the leather product wholesale markets, there are 
some middlemen who form the link between the producers and the 
retailers. If the deals at either level are in cash, the margin between 
buyers' and sellers' prices is five per cent. If on credit, the margin 
is doubled to ten per cent. 
The third and the most important group of lenders in this industry 
is of moneylenders per se i.e. lenders who are in no way involved 
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in production or trade of these items. The bigger ones were not available 
for interview; Jbut the smaller ones who are spread over all locations 
of the industry readily provided the following information. In most 
deals the interest rates vary between 4 to 8 per cent per month. If 
a loan is repaid within a month, then a 4 per cent rate is applied. 
If later, then a rate of 8 per cent is applied. The lenders demand 
no collateral : but if any borrower is a consistent defaulter then a 
word is put out and his sources of credit in all markets dry up completely. 
In other words, the cost of default is being driven out of whatever 
part of the business the borrower had been operating. 
A remarkable feature of this entire credit market is that no agent 
or borrower however small has to go without credit for want of a 
collateral. After a brief introduction by another, equally assetless borrower, 
he too can get credit on almost identical terms. Obviously, the supply 
of credit to this market has been remarkably elastic since the numbers 
of slum footwear makers and small retail sellers in the business have 
been visibly expanding fast in Gilcutta of recent years. In Madras 
too, there are a large number of units which have not registered with 
the official agencies because they cannot fulfil the latters' many 
requirements : they too have had little difficulty in getting credit from 
similar moneylenders in the informal credit market. 
The other feature of this credit market is that there are clear limits 
to how much an agent can borrow for how long and from whom. 
The big ones deal with the middle level ones and they in turn give 
smaller amounts to the next layer and so on. At each level there 
is a tacit understanding about the limits to borrowing. In other words, 
though the interest rates in this market can be high, there is no attempt 
to clear the market for loanable funds by raising them further as 
demand rises. Instead at each level, there is a rationing of credit with 
interest rates remaining steady. 
Moral Hazard 
This particular kind of problem is seldom discussed in the standard 
literature on credit rationing (Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990) which usually 
talks of limits on the number of borrowers rather than on the size 
of the loans given to a fairly open ended number of borrowers. The 
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emergence of this particular arrangement in the Indian business world 
may be the outcome of two sets of circumstances. On the one hand, 
the lenders and loanable funds in the market are a part of a continuum 
of the enormously large lending operations going on in the informal 
market serving the entire gamut of trade and small businesses in India. 
We have not explored this market at all but one can say that lenders 
here cannot arbitrarily raise interest rates beyond the generally available 
range of 4 to 8 per cent: if they did, they are likely to be undercut 
by competition from fresh lenders. These loans with their quick turnover 
and highly liquid character would be very attractive to new lenders. 
Also, the amounts involved in one centre for one group of borrowers 
are very small compared to the large size of loanable funds in this 
market. That is precisely why loans are readily available without any 
kind of security. 
On the other hand, that there are limits on the sizes of the loans 
is largely due to the uncertainty about the credit worthiness and reliability 
of the borrowers. Although the market is multilayered so that the 
total potential borrowers are divided into smaller groups and each is 
dealt with by a different lender who is somewhat familiar with the 
characteristics of that particular group and business, there is still the 
uncertainty about the plans of each individual within the group. In 
other words, there is a possibility of a 'moral hazard' and adverse 
selection of projects in case large loans are given under such arrangements 
(Jaffee and Russell 1976). 
In the absence of a tangible asset to act as a collateral, the only 
cost that the lender can impose on the borrower is to drive the latter 
out of business. This is a fixed cost and its ceiling is the expected 
value of the life time returns on the business to the latter. If the 
amount of loan is sufficiently large, then some of the borrowers may 
prefer to leave the business, default on the loan and go away. Or 
they may go in for more riskier projects than they had contemplated 
(a bigger business or a business with which they are unfamiliar) because 
the bigger loan is available. Both these effects - the moral hazard 
of default - or the incentive for adverse selection - to choose riskier 
projects - are very possible in this market because the borrowers have 
very little stake in the business by way of fixed investment. Firstly, 
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the business at hand in the view of the borrower himself may not 
have v< -y good prospects in the long run. Or, in the case of the 
Chamars, they have an alternative living in rural areas or in other 
cities. If default on a loan which is sufficiently large can only be 
punished by being driven out of that business, a Chamar borrower, 
for example, would have every incentive to default on it and use 
the capital to upgrade his alternative living in the native place. Since 
the lender cannot ex ante know who is likely to be innately honesL 
or what the life time prospects of each are, his best policy is to 
ration credit within a strict fairly low limit and spread the amount 
over a large number of borrowers. That way he keeps the borrowers 
within their traditional limits and types of businesses. 
Obviously, the outcome which is crucial for the industry as a whole 
is that there is neither any possibility of the borrowers being able 
to invest in fixed capital for upgrading technology or to reach an 
efficient scale of any of the operations. In every part of the business, 
there is a proliferation of tiny units. This has probably helped to 
create considerable employment in the industry : but it has meant 
that none of the operations can be modernised. Also, since entry in 
any part of the business is easy, there is a constant downward pressure 
on the returns from the employment. This too means that the sqlf 
employed workers cannot build up their personal savings for investing 
in the business. In Madras on the other hand, where some small units 
had got formal sector credit on reasonable terms, the owners have 
been able to invest in new machines for changing the nature of their 
business. 
VIII 
Conclusion 
This study has highlighted some of the crucial problems that can 
inhibit the potential for growth of a traditional industry. Even when 
market conditions and government policies come to favour its rapid 
expansion, the agents who had been historically associated with it do 
not always have the capacity to alter their production organisations, 
technologies or marketing practices in the required direction. And, since 
there are no alternative opportunities for work available for them in 
the economy, they try hard to hold on to their existing niche in that 
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industry. The combined strength of the resistance offered by these 
various agencies can act as a major hindrance in the realisation of 
what are otherwise bright prospects for development of a given industry. 
The leather industry of India is a classic case for illustrating this 
problem. It has had a continued presence in the Indian economy throughout 
the latter's long history. In the process, it has come to develop a 
huge network of institutions which have meshed into a fairly smooth 
running machinery to reach widely scattered sources of inputs and 
ever new markets. Along with this have grown several groups of 
deeply entrenched vested interests linked with the industry; these interests 
have continually tried to adjust to changing market conditions but they 
have always resisted any possibility of modernisation which can make 
them redundant. The outcome of a confrontation between these traditional 
forces and fast changing market conditions can at best be uncertain 
and inefficient. Several of the issues emerging from the analysis which 
have some policy implications are summed up below. 
Labour and Enterprise 
In both Madras and Calcutta, operators working on the early stages 
of processing of hides and skins still continue to be identified with 
some of the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy . In Calcutta, side 
by side, there has grown a tradition by which enterprise in the industry 
also belongs to the minority communities of Muslims and the Chinese. 
By some additional historical accidents, all these agents— both workers 
and entrepreneurs— in Calcutta are not Bengali speaking; they hail 
from the neighbouring Hindi speaking states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
The Chinese too strictly adhere to their locality and community identities. 
In Madras on the other hand, except for a sprinkling of Muslims 
from North india among the entrepreneurs, most people in the industry 
are Tamil speaking local people. 
There is no active workers' union in Madras and there is little 
evidence of antagonism between workers and employers in recent years. 
Workers are not formally permanently attached to any unit and are 
paid by piece rates; this way the employers ensure the flexibility they 
need in work geared to fulfilling orders from other agents; but most 
workers do find continuous employment usually with the same employer. 
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And according to available reports, none ot" them earns less than Rs.3(X)0/-
per month. So far changes in technology and machinery have been 
facilitated by new workers being brought in at the technical level; 
but older workers are retained as their helpers. They are then trained 
in operating the new machines over the next six months or so. Most 
employees are eager to acquire technical training for new skills and 
appreciate the opportunities given for doing so on the job. Many of 
them are increasingly investing in giving formal technical training to 
their children. Workers are amenable to these flexible arrangements 
also because they all enjoy facilities of a provident fund, employees' 
health insurance and a dearness allowance. The arrangements seem 
to be working well because there are instances of workers saving 
enough to start new units of their own. 
In Calcutta on the other hand, relations between workers and employers 
have been highly antagonistic and workers' efforts to raise wage rates 
(or piece rates) have led several employers to resort to increased 
mechanisation. Workers of the Chamar community have shown little 
inclination for acquiring training for working with modern mechinery. 
Nor is there any evidence of children of the community being given 
better education or formal skills. Employers in the few modernising 
units have taken steps to train a few of their workers to operate 
the new machines: one employer we met had sent his senior-most 
worker to Italy to familiarise him with the new computerised machines 
that were being installed. But in general employers have shown little 
initiative in this matter mainly because they do not find any need 
for it. Same is true of the workers in self-employment who are in 
no state to contemplate modernising of their own units or skills. 
There is no doubt that the active interest taken by local institutions 
like the Tanners' Association has helped to create a sense of security 
and mutual trust between the workers and the employers in Chromepet. 
(It was the Association which organised measures for workers' security 
and insurance.) It is perhaps also not unwarranted to say that the 
fact that many employers had themselves started as workers has helped 
to ease the relations. Their common Tamil identity too has probably 
been a positive factor contributing to more constructive relations between 
different groups of agents within the Madras industry. In Calcutta on 
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the other hand, as we saw earlier, the workers have developed no 
local links and stick closely to their caste/language alliances. At another 
level, the small entrepreneurs too feel alienated from the local power 
groups particularly in the world of formal and informal finance. Decision 
makers and agents in the formal sector of the world of finance are 
mostly educated Bengali speaking people; they in their turn are ignorant 
and incurious about the workings of an industry which is predominantly 
in the hands of people whom they consider as 'outsiders' even though 
generations of the latter have lived and worked in Calcutta. Their 
apathy to this industry of 'aliens' is so pervasive that the few local 
entrepreneurs who have been trying to break into the leather products 
business have also found little sympathy for their efforts from official 
channels. 
Surprisingly, even in Madras, the community or language based 
closeness felt by the different groups has not led them to develop 
any initiative for some cooperative efforts for strengthening their 
bargaining position vLs-a-vis more poweriul agents. It is quite remarkable 
that the job working units there remain under the hegemony of the 
order giving firms and have not tried to use the leverage of their 
close proximity or community feelings to form a common front. By 
some cooperative efforts they could have got a better deal for all; 
or they could have altogether eliminated the latter and dealt directly 
with the final customers. 
In an earlier paper on the fan industry of Calcutta ( Banerjee 1988) 
a similar situation among the small job working units had been accounted 
for by the severe overall shortage of orders for that work. Since this 
is not the case in the Madras Industry during the last few years, 
the situation is rather puzzling. 
The Credit Problem 
This leads to the other apparently intractable problem of the industry 
in Calcutta. There are practically no sources which the small and 
medium units can tip for long term investible funds. At the same 
time for any potential borrower, short term credit is readily available 
from the informal market. This has triggered off a particularly vicious 
chain of events in the Calcutta industry. There is a growing proliferation 
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of tiny, crudely equipped units making poor quality leather products 
of which the main selling point in an extremely volatile and price 
elastic market is their low price. The units compete fiercely amongst 
themselves driving down the margins accruing to the labour, the enterprise 
and the trade involved in the operations. Therefore, though a very 
large number of people arc making some kind of a living from the 
industry, few of them are ever likely to be in a position to accumulate 
any funds for upgrading their own living or their production units. 
In its turn the growing demand for cheap leather to be used in these 
low quality products keeps the existing crude tanneries in operation. 
They too have neither the resources nor the incentive to streamline 
and upgrade their production organisations. 
The Calcutta leather industry then is somewhat like a house of 
cards where several equally fragile and outmoded segments are found 
propping up each other. Any major change like the imminent enforcement 
of antipollution laws on the tanneries can blow down this entire structure. 
If tanneries are forced to take antipollution measures and/or to move 
to a new site, the older ones will probably find it difficult to raise 
the necessary resources. Many of them may be forced to close down. 
The new tanneries that may come up in the proposed leather park 
on the eastern fringes of the city will have a higher cost structure 
if only because of the antipollution equipment required at that site. 
If the costs of the tanneries and consequently the prices of the 
leather they supply go up, the self-employed workers making cheap 
leather products out of those supplies are likely to be driven out of 
the market for leather products. As in Madras, the competition from 
products of synthetic materials is a standing threat for them. How 
this collapse of the industry in its existing form will affect the very 
large numbers of traders, creditors and retailers who have been linked 
with it is also fraught with grave uncertainty. 
Emergence of a New Industry 
Even if this end of the market does collapse, the leather industry 
will still have bright prospects given the growing demand from foreign 
and domestic higher price markets. The availability of raw materials 
from this vast area of eastern India will no doubt attract big capital 
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of Indian or foreign origin to the region; and, provided the West 
Bengal Government can provide all the necessary infrastructure 1 services 
at an early date, the proposed site /ok a leather park on Calcutta's 
fringes is likely to prove attractive' to them because water, one of 
the most important input in tanning, is more easily available here 
than in many other parts of India. 
The question is, will the resurrected industry provide employment 
to local people in significant numbers? Thfc.leather industry has often 
been lauded for its potential to create viable employment for rural 
people of low social status. And the Madras example shows that in 
urban areas too, it can support many small initiatives specially in 
the leather products business. For the realisation of both these possibilities, 
however, the state has to play a strong supportive role. In the rural 
areas, there must be effort made to start local collection and processing 
of hides and skins on a well-organised scientific; basis. If left to the 
private sector, such decentralised organisation might be very slow in 
coming up. They would find it difficult to make the necesary contacts 
and arrangements at the grassroots level. And since they are now 
permitted to import raw hides and skins they have little incentive 
to undertake building such an elaborate organisation. The stale Government 
on the other hand can utilise local agencies like the Panchayets to 
take up this work provided it can find the finances for equipping 
the local bodies with vehicles for speedy transport of the felled animals 
and machinery for the preliminary processing. The region does have 
an immense potential for such programmes which should not be allowed 
to go waste. 
The West Bengal Government should also revive the National Tannery 
which at one time was very well equipped. It is now under the ownership 
of the former but has been lying closed for over a decade. 
For urban small units making leather products, there are constraints 
of finding both financial capital and the necessary training for skills 
for treating leather and designing products. Here too public initiative 
to develop several institutions for providing these services cheaply and 
readily is of crucial importance. In Madras, the Tanners' Association 
as well as the offices of Export Promotion Council and Central Leather 
Research Institute there have provided crucial help to the industry 
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by locating markets, designing machines and advising entrepreneurs 
on technological development. The small producers in Calcutta too 
require such supporting institutions specially for greater provision of 
training facilities at several levels and for establishing channels for 
disseminating information about ongoing developments in the industry. 
The state Industries department must try to activate the existing 
servicing institutions or create new ones to get this process working. 
Particularly, public agencies must break the barriers that exist between 
small entrepreneurs and formal sector credit giving institutions. Unless 
investible resources are made readily available for the modernisation 
and expansion of the capital equipment of small units, they cannot 
hope to operate in the kind of markets that are now emerging. 
Free and unfettered operation of markets is supposed to facilitate 
the optimal utilization of available resources in each economy. This 
paper has tried to demonstrate how this can only happen when the 
stranglehold of many traditional institutions is broken. And for that 
to happen it is essential for the state to intervene in a big way at 
some crucial points. 
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Notes 
1. A recent paper by Timo Nicholas Salminen, a UN1DO Consultant 
had dealt with one of the firm level characteristics in the leather 
industry particularly of the North Arcot district in Tamil Nadu. 
2. The Chairman of the Council for Leather gave the following figures 
of the global turnover. In 1980, it was $20 billion. In 1994, it 
had risen to $45 billion and was exported to go up to $75 billion 
by the end of the century. (Statesman 16/6/94). 
3. The Madras units mostly work on orders from export houses or on 
job work for several large brand names like Bata making expensive 
quality goods. These units are organised to work within rigidly fixed 
time schedules and with modern machines specially for finishing their 
wares. The new traditional makers of cheap chappals are fast being 
absorbed as workers in the modern industry and the cheap end of 
the market that they have been serving is being taken over by footwear 
of synthetic materials. This section therefore has considered only the 
Calcutta case. 
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Appendix 1 
Major recommendations of various committees set up by 
Govt, of India 
COMMITTEE RECOM MENATIONS 
ACCEPTED 
OBJECTIVES REMARKS 
1. The 
Seetharamiah 
Committee 
(1973) 
2. The Kaul 
Committee 
(1979) 
i) A ban on export of raw 
hides and skins 
ii) Quota restrictions on 
export of semi-finished 
leather; 
iii) A simultaneous increase 
in finished leather 
manufacturing capacity; 
and 
iv) Comprehensive incentives 
for increasing finished 
leather exports. 
v) Cash Compensatory 
Scheme, Duty drawbacks 
and Import Replenishment 
license are the incentives 
given to promote exports 
i) In order to strengthen the 
industry's production base, 
the Committee's major 
thrust was to encourage 
liberal capital goods 
imports; 
ii) It recommended the 
reduction of import duty 
to a uniform rate of 25 
per cent on all tanning, 
finishing and leather goods 
machinery which were 
placed on OGL list. 
i) To increase the 
employment potential 
for leather industry 
ii) To make the industry 
earn foreign exchange 
Mechanisation of 
industry 
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3. The Pa tide 
Commit tee 
(1985) 
4. T h e Mur thy 
Commi t t ee 
(1992) 
i) Increased raw material 
availabil i ty to enable the 
manufac tu re of high 
quality and high value 
added leather products ; 
ii) upgrade skills and 
modernise t echno logy ; 
iii) make foo twear the most 
important single item of 
e x p o r t ; 
To increase the share of 
Indian leather industry in 
i) Dereservat ion and 
de l i cens ing ; 
ii) Promot ion of joint venture the global market f rom 4 
in India and a b r o a d ; per cent to 10 per cent 
iii) Targe ted investment 
promotion campaigns to 
attract f resh capital; 
iv) Creat ion of technical 
training modernisat ion 
f u n d ; 
v) Establ ishing a technical 
educat ion au thor i ty ; 
vi) Limit import duty on 
capital g o o d s ; 
consumables and materials 
to 15 per cent . 
The report 
of the 
Commit tee 
has been 
plain in its 
v iew that an 
enhanced 
share of the 
global 
market can 
be achieved 
only by 
intentionally 
curbing 
domest ic 
off- take. 
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